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EFFICIENT AND SECURE KEY DISTRIBUTION
PROTOCOL FOR WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS
ABSTRACT
Modern wireless sensor networks have adopted the IEEE 802.15.4 standard.
This standard defines the first two layers, the physical andmedium access control layers;
determines the radio wave used for communication; and defines the 128-bit advanced
encryption standard (AES-128) for encrypting and validating transmitted data. How-
ever, the standard does not specify how to manage, store, or distribute encryption keys.
Many solutions have been proposed to address this problem, but themajority are imprac-
tical in resource-constrained devices such as wireless sensor nodes or cause degradation
of other metrics. Therefore, we propose an efficient and secure key distribution proto-
col that is simple, practical, and feasible to implement on resource-constrained wireless
sensor nodes. We conduct simulations and hardware implementations to analyze our
work and compare it to existing solutions based on different metrics, such as energy
consumption, storage overhead, key connectivity, replay attack, man-in-the-middle at-
tack, and resiliency to node capture attack. Our findings show that the proposed protocol
is secure and more efficient than other solutions.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Awireless sensor network (WSN) is a network composed of resource-constrained
devices with the ability to perform sensing and wireless communications, which are
called wireless sensor nodes. WSN nodes link a spatial space or an object to a com-
puting system for the purpose of monitoring, controlling, or targeting. The concept of
WSNs was developed by the U.S. military [1–3]. Then, academic institutions began to
improve upon this technology. These improvements led to advances in hardware and
communication; for example, wireless sensor nodes became smaller in size and more
cost-effective. Today, WSNs enable cyber-physical system (CPS) applications [4–10],
and they have become a core technology in the Internet of things (IoT) [11–14]. WSNs
have become rapidly involved in a variety of modern purposes, with applications in
agriculture, the environment, health, home and commercial automation, the military
and transportation [15–25].
1.1 Research Problem And Scope
Modern WSNs adopt the IEEE 802.15.4 standard, which specifies the physical
layer and the medium access control (MAC) layer for low-rate wireless personal area
networks (LR-WPANs). The standarad also determines the radio frequency used for
communication and provides four security services: access control, confidentially, in-
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tegrity and replay protection. The MAC layer handles security for the IEEE 802.15.4
standard and defines the 128-bit advanced encryption standard (AES-128) for encrypt-
ing and validating transmitted data. Unfortunately, the standard does not specify how to
manage, store, or distribute encryption keys [26]. Many solutions have been proposed
to address this problem, but the majority are impractical in resource-constrained devices
such as wireless sensor nodes or cause degradation of other metrics.
1.2 Motivation Behind The Research
In the literature, many solutions have been proposed to address the key distribu-
tion problem, but the majority are impractical in resource-constrained devices such as
wireless sensor nodes or cause degradation of other metrics. For example, some of these
schemes applied asymmetric encryptions without a proper adjustment for resource-
constrained devices. This type of schemes may be secure against some attacks, but it is
inefficient in terms of energy and memory consumption. To circumvent this, some other
schemes implemented symmetric encryption, but they too relied on energy and mem-
ory consuming techniques such as: storing several keys in each sensor node, engaging
intermediary nodes, or exchanging numerous frames to find a common key between sen-
sor nodes. Additional schemes adapted quantum cryptography for the key distribution,
although quantum cryptography is not yet practical in resource-constrained devices.
Additionally, most of these schemes did not consider the energy consumed by
the nodes transceivers, the energy consumed by the transmitters power output (TPO),
and the energy consumption caused by wireless channel effects.
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1.3 Contributions Of The Proposed Research
In this work, we propose an efficient and secure key distribution protocol for
WSNs. We utilized the existing cryptographic primitives to design a protocol that is
simple, practical and feasible to implement on resource-constrained devices such as
wireless sensor nodes. The contributions of our work can be summarized as follows.
• We introduce a comprehensive classification for the main key distribution and key
establishment schemes in WSNs. We classify the schemes into traditional key
distribution schemes, including private-key-based schemes and public-key-based
schemes, and quantum-based key distribution schemes, including those based on
entanglement swapping and teleportation.
• We propose an efficient and secure key distribution protocol that is simple, prac-
tical and feasible to implement on resource-constrained devices such as wireless
sensor nodes. Because data communication is responsible for most of a node’s en-
ergy consumption [27], the proposed protocol utilizes the existing cryptographic
primitives and leverages asymmetric encryption to achieve key distribution and
node authentication in one step and using only one frame to avoid communica-
tion overhead. Moreover, the implementation of the proposed protocol adopts
the following techniques: a fast modular exponentiation algorithm (described in
Chapter 4, Section 4.4) and a short public exponent. These techniques speed up
the node’s data computation, resulting in lower energy consumption.
• We analyze and compare the proposed protocol against different types of schemes
using various metrics, including energy consumption, key connectivity, storage
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overhead, man-in-the-middle attack, replay attack and resiliency to node capture
attack. Our methodology (described in Chapter 4) combines simulations, hard-
ware implementations and practical models to calculate both the energy consump-
tion of sensor nodes and the energy consumption caused by wireless channel ef-
fects.
• We visualize and analyze the key connectivity and the impact of node capture
attack using a graph. We model a WSN as a graph and then implement the pro-
posed protocol and the corresponding schemes on the graph to investigate their
key connectivity and the impact of node capture attack on the key connectivity.
• We conduct a formal verification using an automatic cryptographic protocol ver-
ifier, ProVerif. We utilize ProVerif to prove the security and soundness of the
proposed protocol in formal models. We verify the reachability and secrecy, cor-
respondence assertions (authentication) and observational equivalences.
4
CHAPTER 2: RELATEDWORK
Key distribution schemes in WSNs have been comprehensively studied in the
literature. The authors of [28–31] provided detailed surveys. However, in this study,
we present a comprehensive overview of the existing key distribution and key estab-
lishment schemes in WSNs, which we classify into two domains. The first domain
includes traditional key-based distribution schemes, which can be further classified into
private-key-based and public-key-based schemes. Private-key-based schemes can be
subcategorized into grid-based, polynomial-based, probabilistic, and exclusion basis
system (EBS)-based schemes. Public-key-based key distribution schemes can be sub-
categorized based on an integer factorization problem (IFP) or on a discrete logarithm
problem (DLP). The second domain includes quantum-based key distribution schemes,
which can be further classified into entanglement-swapping-based and teleportation-
based schemes. Figure 2.1 depicts this classification hierarchy, and Table 2.1 defines
our evaluation metrics.
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Figure 2.1: Classification of key distribution schemes in WSNs.
Grid-based schemes address a WSN of size n as an
√
n ·√n matrix or grid. In
this subcategory, each node in the WSN is assigned to a unique intersection (i, j) in the
grid [32–34]. An early example was called Peer Intermediaries for Key Establishment in
Sensor Networks (PIKE) [35]. PIKE represents a sensor network of size n by an
√
n·√n
matrix and uses some sensor nodes as trusted intermediaries for key distribution. Each
sensor has an ID in the form of (x, y) based on its position in the matrix. Moreover,
each node is loaded with a pairwise secret key shared only with each node in the two
sets:
(i, y) ∀ i ∈ {1, 2, 3, ...,√n− 1} (2.1)
(x, j) ∀ i ∈ {1, 2, 3, ...,√n− 1}. (2.2)
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Table 2.1: Evaluation Metrics.
Metric Definition
Efficiency
Energy consumption The amount of energy consumed dur-
ing the key distribution/key establishment
process.
Storage overhead The memory required to store keys or
keys materials.
Key connectivity The percentage of available links in a
WSN, calculated as the number of secured
links divided by the total links.
Security
Replay attack The ability of an adversary to replay any
of the corresponding frames.
Man-in-the-middle
attack
The ability of an adversary to impersonate
any sensor node or sink node.
Resiliency to node cap-
ture attack
The impact percentage of a node capture
attack on WSN key connectivity, calcu-
lated as the number of compromised links
over the number of secured links.
Keys are deployed such that in any pairA andB, at least one node C exists that shares a
pairwise key with both A and B. However, this approach suffers from key dependency
because one inoperable or missing node would impact the network connectivity. Addi-
tionally, the search process for intermediary nodes consumes a large amount of energy
because it involves sending many frames to other sensor nodes searching for a node
that shares a pairwise key. Moreover, this approach requires each sensor node to store
2
(√
n− 1) keys.
Polynomial-based schemes depend on storing polynomials on wireless sensor
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nodes that are used for key generation. In [36], this process was described as a threshold
scheme (R,K). The threshold is a shared security scheme that divides a message into
K parts, where R is the minimum number of parts required to reconstruct the original
message. The author of [37], proposed a sharing security scheme that used a polynomial
equation in a finite field to construct a threshold scheme. In this scheme, an arbitrary
polynomial of degree R− 1 was generated in the following form:
(
axR−1 + bx(R−1)−1 + ...+m
)
mod p, (2.3)
where p is a public prime number that is greater than the coefficients,m is the message,
and a and b are randomly chosen coefficients. Many other forms of polynomial-based
key distribution schemes have been proposed [38–43]. In [44], the authors proposed
a polynomial-based key management scheme consisting of three phases. In the first
phase, sensor nodes discover the neighboring nodes and elect a cluster head (CH). In
the second phase, when a sensor node wants to acquire a secure communication channel
through the base station (BS), it sends a registration request. The third phase generates
a triple key. Subsequently, when a sensor node wants to communicate with the CH and
BS, the key is calculated based on a given polynomial and coefficients in a finite group.
In this approach, sensor nodes consume large amounts of energy during the discovery
and cluster-electing phases. Additionally, key connectivity is affected by node capture
attacks.
Probabilistic-based schemes rely on the probability of two sensor nodes shar-
ing a common key to establish a communication link. In [45], the authors proposed a
probabilistic key-based management protocol. This scheme consists of three phases:
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key predistribution, shared-key discovery and path-key establishment. During the key
predistribution phase, a large pool of keys p and their identifiers are generated. Then, a
random set of keys k and their identifiers are drawn out of the key pool p to form a key
ring for each sensor node based on the following formula:
Pkey = 1−
(
((P − k)!)2
((P − 2k)!P !)
)
, (2.4)
where Pkey is the probability of two nodes sharing a common key. Next, the key rings
are loaded into each of the sensor node memories, and the key identifiers are saved on
a trusted controller node along with the associated sensor identifiers. In the shared-
key discovery phase, two sensor nodes can discover a shared key by broadcasting a
list of their key rings. Additionally, the two sensor nodes can hide the key sharing
patterns by broadcasting a list, li = {α||Eki(α)||i = 1, ..., k}, for every key on the
key ring, where α is a challenge. The ability of the receiver to decrypt Eki(α) will
reveal the challenge α and then establish a shared key with the sender. In the path-
key establishment phase, a path key is assigned to each pair of sensor nodes that do
not share a key but are connected to other sensor nodes at the end of the shared-key
discovery phase. However, this approach consumes large amounts of energy because
finding a common key between two sensor nodes requires broadcasting many frames.
Additionally, storing the key ring requires large amounts of memory, especially when
the probability of sensor nodes sharing a common key is certain.
EBS-based schemes are a combinatorial formulation of key management as pro-
posed by [46]. EBS is denoted by EBS(n,k,m) (where n, k, andm are positive integers),
and it is a collection Γ of subset of [1, n] such that for every integers t ∈ [1, n], the fol-
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lowing two properties hold:
1. t is in most k subsets in Γ.
2. there is exactlym subset in Γ such that Ai, ..., Am that t is excluded by a union of
m subsets in Γ,
⋃m
i=1Ai is[1, n]− t.
Many schemes based on EBS have been proposed [47–53]. For example, the authors of
[54] proposed a key generation scheme based on a system of linear equations that utilizes
EBS for key managment. This scheme generates associated keys and then combines
them with EBS for key management. The key management consists of three phases:
pre-deployment, shared-key discovery/path-key establishment, and key redistribution.
In the pre-deployment phase, a system of linear equations with two variables is used to
generate the unique solution/secret keys T (xs, ys):
E(2) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
E1(x, y) : a1,1x+ a1,2y + b1 = 0
...
En(x, y) : an,1x+ an,2y + bn = 0.
(2.5)
To figure out the unique solution, a sensor node needs two equations. However, since
any equation/line of the system can be calculated using two different points on the line,
these two points can be used instead of the equations to form one key. Therefore, each
sensor node requires at least two keys, called the node’s key rings. Corresponding IDs
also are established and distributed with these keys along to the nodes. In the shared-key
discovery/path-key establishment phase, nodes find the common keys by broadcasting
the keys’ IDs. In the key redistribution phase, the exhausted nodes are replaced without
changing the keys. Extending the network requires the new nodes to choose one of
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the key rings or add a new line (equation) that will pass through the secret keys unique
solution/secret keys T (xs, ys). However, this approach is vulnerable to node capture
attacks because compromising one node will reveal the secret keys.
Public-key-based schemes are another class of the traditional key distribution
schemes in WSNs. Practical public-key-based schemes depend on two major fami-
lies of problems: IFPs such as the Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) cryptosystem and
DLPs such as Diffie-Hellman key exchange (DHKE) and elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH). The authors of [55] discussed using public infrastructure such as RSA to im-
prove the security of WSNs. The study considered the WSN topology as a set of wire-
lessly connected sensor nodes that report collected data to the base station. However,
wireless sensor nodes are resource-constrained devices, and a straightforward imple-
mentation of IFP or DLP without appropriate modifications is energy and memory in-
tensive. In [56], the authors proposed a public-key-based key distribution scheme using
ECDH. The scheme consists of two phases: a predeployment phase and a postdeploy-
ment phase. In the predeployment phase, sensor nodes are configured with elliptic curve
(EC) parameters and the basepoint G. Then, αn is generated to calculate Pn = αnG for
all n nodes. Next, αn is stored in each corresponding node, and all Pn are stored in
the sink node. In the postdeployment phase, the sink creates a new secret key b and
calculates its public key Q = bG. The public key is then broadcast to all sensor nodes.
Each sensor node calculates a new key kn = αnQ, whereas the sink calculates a new
key kn = bPn. The downside of this approach is that each node must store all the EC
parameters such as the field over which the curve is defined, the α and b values that
defined the curve and the generator point G.
Quantum-based schemes rely on the laws of physics and require special hard-
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ware. Nevertheless, many authors have proposed solutions. For example, entanglement
swapping was adopted in [57]. This scheme utilizes a third party, called a base station,
to perform entanglement swapping among sensor nodes. Each sensor node shares n
qubits with the base station, and the base station shares m qubits with each sensor
node. When two sensor nodes x and y are separately entangled with the base station,
the base station performs entanglement swapping, allowing sensor node x and sensor
node y to become entangled. As another example, the authors of [58] proposed a
scheme that includes Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR)-pair distribution and quantum
authentication. This scheme allows a sensor node to teleport quantum information
to any other sensor node in the network. The entanglement-swapping-based and
teleportation-based schemes rely on quantum cryptography, which has been proven in
prior literature to be secure unless the laws of physics have been defeated. However,
these schemes require entangled qubits to function, and applying entangled qubits in
resource-constrained devices such asWSNs is not yet practical with existing technology.
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CHAPTER 3: PROPOSED PROTOCOL
The proposed protocol includes four phases: a pre–deployment phase, a key
distribution phase, a post-key distribution phase, and a key refreshment phase. Table
3.1 presents the notations used to describe the proposed protocol.
Table 3.1: Notation for the Proposed Protocol.
Notation Description
y ←− x y is generated by x.
x
def
= y x is defined as y.
x := y y is assigned to x.
H( ) One-way hash function.
|| Concatenation.
send
==⇒ [x] Sending message x.
recv⇐== [x] Receiving message x.
Ek(y) y is encrypted with k.
E⊥k (y) y is encrypted with k using algorithm ⊥.
f( ) Function to compare or verify.
P ( ) Probability function.
F : A )→ B Function maps A to B.
P Plaintext.
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C Cipher text.
Id Node identification.
T Timestamp.
D Data.
3.1 Pre-Deployment Phase
The pre-deployment phase of the protocol consists of five offline steps. The
first step is the generation of an asymmetric key pair {KP , KR} ←− RSAgen, where
RSAgen is the RSA key generation algorithm. In the second step, KP is defined as a
sink node key, AKsink, and KR is defined as the key for the sensor nodes, AKnodes. In
the third step,AKsink is loaded into the sink node, andAKnodes is loaded into the sensor
nodes. The fourth step involves the generation of a random local key for each sensor
node as follows:Klocali
R←− keygen{0, 1}128, where keygen{0, 1}128 is a random key gen-
eration algorithm with a key space of {0, 1}128; the key space is a uniform distribution
such that ∀Klocali ∈ {0, 1}128, and the probability of each key is P (Klocali) = 1|{0,1}128| .
In the fifth step, Klocali is loaded into the corresponding sensor nodei and into the sink
nodes. Figure 3.1 shows pre-deployment phase steps.
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Pre-deployment Phase Steps
{KP , KR}←− RSAgen
KP
def
= AKsink and KR
def
= AKnodes
Sink node := AKsink and Sensor nodes := AKnodes
Klocali
R←− keygen{0, 1}128, ∀Klocali ∈ {0, 1}128 ⇒ P (Klocali) = 1|{0,1}128|
Sensor nodei := Klocali andSink node := Klocali
Figure 3.1: Pre-deployment phase steps.
3.2 Key Distribution Phase
After deploying the sensor nodes, the sink node generates a random
complementary key Kcompl ←− Rangen{0, 1}128, computes its hash value
Tag ←− H(Kcompl), and calculates a timestamp T . The sink node then en-
crypts these values using its asymmetric key AKsink. After this task is com-
plete, the sink node sends the cipher to neighboring sensor nodes as follows:
send
==⇒
[
C ←− EAKsink
(
Kcompl || Tag ←− H(Kcompl) || T
)]
. These neighbors forward
the cipher to their neighbors in a multihop fashion until all of the sensor nodes have
received the cipher recv⇐==
[
C ←− EAKsink (Kcompl || Tag ←− H(Kcompl) || T )
]
.
Because each sensor node is loaded with the asymmetric key AKnodes in
the pre-deployment phase, a sensor nodei can decrypt the cipher as follows:
P ←− DAKnodes
(
C ←− EAKsink (Kcompl || Tag ←− H(Kcompl) || T )
)
and ver-
ifies the timestamp fverify(T ) based on a predefined threshold. If the timestamp
exceeds the threshold, the sensor nodei rejects the cipher. Otherwise, the sensor nodei
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hashes the complementary key Tag′ ←− H (Kcompl) and compares it with the received
hash fcompare(Tag, Tag′) to ensure it has not received a modified complementary key
Kcompl. If a mismatch is found, the sensor nodei rejects the cipher; otherwise, the
sensor nodei produces its unique key by XORing the complementary key and its local
key as follows: Kuniquei = Kcompl ⊕ Klocali . Figure 3.2 shows key distribution phase
steps.
Key Distribution Phase Steps
Sink node:
Kcompl ←− Rangen{0, 1}128, Tag ←− H (Kcompl), and T imestamp T
C ←− EAKsink (Kcompl || Tag ←− H(Kcompl) || T )
send
==⇒
[
C ←− EAKsink
(
Kcompl || Tag ←− H(Kcompl) || T
)]
Sensor nodes:
recv⇐==
[
C ←− EAKsink (Kcompl || Tag ←− H(Kcompl) || T )
]
P ←− DAKnodes
(
C ←− EAKsink (Kcompl || Tag ←− H(Kcompl) || T )
)
fverify(T ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
accept, if T ≤ time threhsold
reject, if T > time threhsold
Tag′ ←− H (Kcompl)
fcompare(Tag, Tag′) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
accept, if match
reject, if dismatch
Kuniquei = Kcompl ⊕Klocali
Figure 3.2: Key distribution phase steps.
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3.3 Post-Key Distribution Phase
After establishing the key distribution phase, the sensor nodes have already
produced their unique keys. Therefore, when sensor nodei wants to transmit data
D to the sink node, it uses its unique key Kuniquei to encrypt the data D, its iden-
tity Idi, and a timestamp T ; then, it concatenates the cipher with another copy of its
identity Id′i and sends both to the sink node. This process is described as follows:
send
==⇒
[
Id′i || C ←− E⊥Kuniquei (D || Idi || T )
]
, where ⊥ is a probabilistic encryption
algorithm. Because this study is concerned with key distribution, the sensor nodei can
use any secure probabilistic encryption algorithm. When the sink node receives the fol-
lowing cipher recv⇐==
[
Id′i || C ←− E⊥Kuniquei (D || Idi || T )
]
, it uses the concatenated
node Id′i to find the corresponding Kuniquei as follows: F : Id′i )→ Kuniquei . Then, the
sink node decrypts the cipher and compares the identities fcompare(Id, Id′), to ensure
that the appropriate Kuniquei is used and that the cipher is received from an authorized
node. If a match is found, the sink node verifies the timestamp T , fverify(T ), based
on a predefined threshold. When T is less than or equal to the threshold, the sink node
accepts the sensor data D; otherwise, it rejects the sensor data D. Figure 3.3 shows
post-key distribution phase steps.
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Post-key Distribution Phase Steps
Sensor nodes:
Sensor data D,Nodei identity Idi, and T imestamp T
C ←− E⊥Kuniquei (D || Idi || T )
send
==⇒
[
Id′i || C ←− E⊥Kuniquei (D || Idi || T )
]
Sink node:
recv⇐==
[
Id′i || C ←− E⊥Kuniquei (D || Idi || T )
]
F : Id′i )→ Kuniquei
P ←− D⊥Kuniquei
(
C ←− E⊥Kuniquei (D || Idi || T )
)
fcompare(Id, Id′) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
accept, if match
reject, if dismatch
fverify(T ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
accept, if T ≤ time threhsold
reject, if T > time threhsold
Figure 3.3: Post-key distribution phase steps.
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3.4 Key Refreshment Phase
In the key refreshment phase, the sink node generates a new random com-
plementary key Kcomplnew ←− Rangen{0, 1}128, computes its hash value Tag ←−
H(Kcomplnew), and calculates a timestamp T . The sink node then encrypts these
values using its asymmetric key AKsink and sends the cipher to the neighbor-
ing sensor nodes as follows: send==⇒
[
C ←− EAKsink
(
Kcomplnew || Tag ←−
H(Kcomplnew) || T
)]
. These neighbors forward the cipher to their neigh-
bors in a multihop fashion until all of the sensor nodes have received the ci-
pher recv⇐==
[
C ←− EAKsink (Kcomplnew || Tag ←− H(Kcomplnew) || T )
]
. Be-
cause the sensor nodes are loaded with the asymmetric key AKnodes in the pre-
deployment phase, a sensor nodei can decrypt the cipher as follows: P ←−
DAKnodes
(
C ←− EAKsink (Kcomplnew || Tag ←− H(Kcomplnew) || T )
)
and verifies the
timestamp fverify(T ), based on a predefined threshold. If T exceeds the threshold, the
sensor nodei rejects the cipher; otherwise, the node hashes the new complementary key
Tag′ ←− H (Kcomplnew) and compares it with the received hash fcompare(Tag, Tag′) to
ensure it has not received a modified new complementary key Kcomplnew . If a mis-
match is found, the sensor nodei rejects the cipher; otherwise, it produces its new
unique key by XORing the new complementary key and its local key as follows:
Kuniqueinew = Kcomplnew ⊕Klocali . Figure 3.4 shows key refreshment phase steps.
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Key Refreshment Phase Steps
Sink node:
Kcomplnew ←− Rangen{0, 1}128, Tag ←− H (Kcomplnew), and Timestamp T
C ←− EAKsink (Kcomplnew || Tag ←− H(Kcomplnew) || T )
send
==⇒
[
C ←− EAKsink
(
Kcomplnew || Tag ←− H(Kcomplnew) || T
)]
Sensor nodes:
recv⇐==
[
C ←− EAKsink (Kcomplnew || Tag ←− H(Kcomplnew) || T )
]
P ←− DAKnodes
(
C ←− EAKsink (Kcomplnew || Tag ←− H(Kcomplnew) || T )
)
fverify(T ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
accept, if T ≤ time threhsold
reject, if T > time threhsold
Tag′ ←− H (Kcomplnew)
fcompare(Tag, Tag′) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
accept, if match
reject, if dismatch
Kuniqueinew = KKcomplnew ⊕Klocali
Figure 3.4: Key refreshment phase steps.
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY
4.1 Experiment Design And Parameters
The experimental design includes two parts: simulation and hardware imple-
mentation. In the first part, we utilize the OPNET Modeler to design a model for a
wireless sensor node and then used this model to conduct simulations for a network of
200 wireless sensor nodes, as shown in Figure 4.1. Our sensor node model calculates
the energy consumption of a node’s transceiver, including both the TPO and the en-
ergy consumption caused by wireless channel effects, based on the models described in
Section 4.2 and Section 4.3, respectively.
In the second part, because the energy consumption by a node’s microcontroller
cannot be simulated, we implement the proposed protocol and the compared schemes
on a real microcontroller and measure the time these schemes require to perform key
distribution/establishment processes. Then, we calculate the energy consumption of the
node’s microcontroller based on the model described in Section 4.2.
Moreover, in this experiment, the transceiver parameters of our sensor node
model are based on XBee transceiver S1 [59], and the microcontroller used in the im-
plementation is an Atmega328p [60] (clocked at 16 MHz). Table 4.1 shows these pa-
rameters.
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Figure 4.1: Our wireless sensor node model.
Table 4.1: Experiment Parameters.
Description Parameters Values
Channel
Data Rate 250 kbps
Frame Size 1024 bits
Transmission power 0 dBm
Modulation bpsk
Receiver Sensitivity -92 dBm
Transceiver
Tx Current draw 45 mA @ 3.3 VDC
Rx Current draw 50 mA @ 3.3 VDC
Microcontroller Microcontroller 3.2 mA @ 4.5 V
Power Requirements
Tx power consumption 148.5 mW
Rx power consumption 165 mW
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Microcontroller power consump-
tion
14.4mW
4.2 Energy Consumption Of Wireless Sensor Node
The energy consumption of a wireless sensor node is the total amount of en-
ergy consumed by the node’s transceiver, microcontroller, and sensors, as indicated in
equation (4.1). Because our research considers key distribution security and efficiency
regardless of the network’s application, we ignore the energy consumed by the sensors
because that consumption is based on sensor applications regardless of the underlying
key distribution/establishment algorithm. Thus, in this study, the energy consumption
of a wireless sensor node is calculated by equation (4.2):
Esensor node = Etransceiver + Emicrocontroller + Esensor (4.1)
Esensor node = Etransceiver + Emicrocontroller. (4.2)
The energy consumption is generally calculated by equation (4.3):
Energy(J) = Power(W ) · Time(S), (4.3)
where Power(W ) is calculated by equation (4.4):
Power(W ) = V oltage(V ) · Current(A). (4.4)
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Based on equation (4.3), we calculate the energy consumption of nodes’ transceivers
and microcontrollers. The following subsections describe these calculations.
4.2.1 Energy Consumption Of The Transceiver
The energy consumption of a node’s transceiver Etransceiver, given in equation
(4.2), is the energy consumed by the node’s transmitter ETx and its receiver ERx. How-
ever, the energy consumption of the node’s transmitterETx is the total energy consumed
by the TPO ETxTPO and the transmitter electronics ETxelec , which can be found by the
following equation:
ETx = ETxTPO + ETxelec , (4.5)
where the energy consumed by ETxTPO is found by equation (4.6):
ETxTPO = Txpoweroutput · Txtime, (4.6)
where Txpoweroutput is the TPO,and it depends on the transceiver module (described in
Section 4.1). Txtime is the time that a node’s transmitter takes to send one frame and is
found by equation (4.7):
Txtime =
(
FrSize
TxDR
)
, (4.7)
where FrSize is the frame size, and TxDR is the data rate of the transmitter. The
transmitter data rate depends on the transceiver module (described in Section 4.1).
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The energy consumed by the transmitter electronics ETxelec can be calculated as
follows:
ETxelec = Txtime ·
(
(Txeleccurrent · Txelecvoltage) + (MATxcurrent ·MATxvoltage)
)
, (4.8)
where Txtime is found as shown in equation (4.7). Txeleccurrent and Txelecvoltage
are the respective current and voltage required by the transmitter’s electronics, and
MATxcurrent and MATxvoltage are the respective current and voltage required by a
node’s microcontroller to run the transmitter.
The energy consumption of the node’s receiverERx can be calculated as follows:
ERx = Rxtime ·
(
(Rxcurrent ·Rxvoltage) + (MARxcurrent ·MARxvoltage)
)
, (4.9)
where Rxtime is the time that a node’s receiver requires to receive one frame, which
can be found by equation (4.10). Rxcurrent and Rxvoltage are the respective current
and voltage required by a node’s receiver, and MARxcurrent and MARxvoltage are the
respective current and voltage required by a node’s microcontroller to run the receiver.
Rxtime =
(
FrSize
RxDR
)
, (4.10)
where FrSize is the frame size, andRxDR is the data rate of the receiver. The receiver’s
data rate depends on the transceiver module (described in Section 4.1).
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4.2.2 Energy Consumption Of The Microcontroller
The energy consumption of a node’s microcontroller, Emicrocontroller, presented
in equation (4.2), represents the energy consumed by a node’s microcontroller, EMA,
and can be found using the following equation:
EMA = MAT imeoperate ·MAcurrent ·MAvoltage, (4.11)
MAT imeoperate is the time required by the microcontroller to execute the core algorithm
of a key distribution/establishment process. MAcurrent andMAvoltage are the respective
current and voltage required by the microcontroller.
4.3 Modeling Wireless Channel Effects
When our sensor node model receives a frame, it calculates the received power
PRx of the frame as follows:
PRx = PTx ·GTx ·GRx · PLoss, (4.12)
where PTx is the transmitter power, GTx is the transmitter antenna gain, GRx is the
receiver antenna gain, and PLoss is the path loss in free space, which can be found by
the following equation:
PLoss =
(
λ
4πD
)2
, (4.13)
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where λ is the wavelength, and D is the distance.
If the received power is less than the receiver sensitivity, our model discards the
frame because the receiver is unable to decode it. However, if the received power is
greater than or equal to the receiver’s sensitivity, our model calculates the noise in each
frame caused by interference from other frames and then calculates the signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR) based on equation (4.14):
SNR = 10 log10
(
PRx
NIntern
)
. (4.14)
Then, our model calculates the bit error rate (BER) in the received frame, which
is calculated based on the chosen modulation curve and the SNR. Finally, it calculates
the percentage of errors in the received frame by the following equation:
FErrors =
(
BER
Fsize
)
, (4.15)
where Fsize is the frame size. If the percentage of errors in the received frame FErrors
exceeds a specified threshold, the model discards the frame.
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4.4 Fast Modular Exponentiation Algorithm
Algorithm: Square-and-multiply
Input : base a; mod n; binary representation of exponent e
[et, et−1, ..., e0]2
Output: ae mod n
1 b← 1
2 for (i = t; i > 0; i−−) do
3 b = b · b mod n
4 if (ei == 1) then
5 b = b · a mod n
6 end
7 end
8 return b
The proposed protocol relies on modular exponentiation in the key distribution
phase. The running time for an ordinary modular exponentiation algorithm is exponen-
tial with the magnitude of the exponent e (linear complexity); thus the algorithm is not
a practical. To make the proposed protocol practical in resource-constrained nodes, we
utilized the square-and-multiply algorithm, which has a polynomial running time in the
length of e (logarithmic complexity).
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CHAPTER 5: FINDINGS AND ANALYSES
In this section, we analyze the efficiency and security of the proposed protocol
in comparison to the schemes proposed in [35], [44], [45], and [55]. These analyses are
based on the metrics presented in Table 2.1.
5.1 Efficiency Analysis
5.1.1 Energy Consumption
Table 5.1 compares the energy consumption required by the proposed protocol
and the corresponding schemes to perform a key distribution/establishment process be-
tween two nodes. (Because some schemes perform key distribution and others conduct
key establishment, we refer to both terms as the “key distribution/establishment pro-
cess.”). The experimental design and parameters are described in Chapter 4, Secion
4.1.
The first part of the table includes eight rows to quantify the energy consumed by
the nodes’ transceivers. The first row, “Th.N.F.Tx,” represents the theoretical number
of frames sent by a node’s transmitter when performing a key distribution/establishment
process without modeling wireless channel effects. The second row, “Av.N.F.Tx,”
shows the average number of frames sent after modeling the wireless channel effects.
The third row, “N.F.Rx,” shows the number of frames that a node’s receiver receives
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during the key distribution/establishment process. If a scheme involves exchanged
frames for node discovery or clustering before the key distribution/establishment pro-
cess, the fourth row, “N.F.ND.C,” represents the number of those frames. The fifth row,
“T.Tx,” shows the time the node’s transmitter requires to send the frames. The sixth row,
“T.Rx,” shows the time the node’s receiver requires to receive the frames. The seventh
row, “E.TPO,” shows the energy consumed by the transmitter power output (TPO). The
eighth row, “E.TRX,” shows the total energy consumed by the nodes’ transceivers.
The second part of the table quantifies the energy consumption of the nodes’
microcontrollers and includes eight rows. The first row, “S.C.K,” represents the search
complexity for finding a common key, where n is the number of nodes, P is the key
pool size, and PC is the probability that two nodes share a key. The next six rows show
the time a node’s microcontroller requires to perform the various operations required
to complete the key distribution/establishment process. The “T.MA.K” row shows the
time a node’s microcontroller requires to find a common key; “T.MA.X” is the time a
node’s microcontroller requires to perform an XOR operation; “T.MA.H” is the time a
node’s microcontroller requires to perform a hashing operation; “T.MA.E” is the time a
node’s microcontroller requires for encryption; and “T.MA.D” is the time a node’s mi-
crocontroller requires for decryption. When a scheme involves polynomial evaluation,
“T.MA.P.E” is the time a node’s microcontroller requires for polynomial evaluation.
The eighth row, “E.MA,” shows the total energy consumed by the nodes’ microcon-
trollers.
The last part of the table, “T.C.E,” shows the total energy consumption of the
proposed protocol and the corresponding schemes.
30
Ta
bl
e
5.
1:
En
er
gy
co
ns
um
pt
io
n
of
ea
ch
ke
y
di
str
ib
ut
io
n
sc
he
m
e
D
es
cr
ip
tio
ns
❛
❛
❛
❛
❛
❛
❛
❛
❛
❛
Pa
ra
m
et
er
sS
ch
em
es
O
ur
Pr
ot
oc
ol
Sc
he
m
e[
35
]
Sc
he
m
e[
44
]
Sc
he
m
e[
45
]
Sc
he
m
e[
55
]
Th
e
pa
ra
m
et
er
s
th
at
co
nt
rib
ut
e
to
th
e
en
er
gy
co
ns
um
pt
io
n
of
no
de
s’
tra
ns
ce
iv
er
s.
Th
.N
.F
.T
x
1
27
6
95
2
Av
.N
.F
.T
x
3
39
13
12
0
4
N
.F
.R
x
1
27
6
95
2
N
.F
.N
D
.C
N
A
2
20
1
N
A
N
A
T.
Tx
12
.2
9
m
s
15
9.
74
m
s
87
6.
54
m
s
49
1.
52
m
s
16
.3
8
m
s
T.
R
x
4.
10
m
s
11
0.
59
m
s
84
7.
87
m
s
38
9.
12
m
s
8.
19
m
s
E.
TP
O
0.
01
m
J
0.
16
m
J
0.
88
m
J
0.
49
m
J
0.
02
m
J
E.
TR
X
2.
75
m
J
46
.0
2
m
J
29
5.
77
m
J
15
0.
37
m
J
4.
15
m
J
Th
e
pa
ra
m
et
er
s
th
at
co
nt
rib
ut
e
to
th
e
en
er
gy
co
ns
um
pt
io
n
of
no
de
s’
m
ic
ro
co
-
nt
ro
lle
r.
C
.S
.K
O
(1
)
O
( 2·√
n
−
1
)
O
(1
)
O
( √ −
P
·lo
g(
1
−
P
c)
) 1
O
(n
)
T.
M
A
.K
N
A
10
.0
8
m
s
N
A
89
.3
1
m
s
17
0.
02
m
s
T.
M
A
.X
0.
35
m
s
N
A
N
A
N
A
N
A
T.
M
A
.H
17
7.
82
m
s
N
A
N
A
N
A
N
A
T.
M
A
.E
98
2
m
s
t2
N
A
N
A
98
2
m
s
T.
M
A
.D
15
02
.9
0
m
s
t2
N
A
N
A
15
02
.9
0
m
s
T.
M
A
.P
.E
N
A
N
A
19
09
.8
3
m
s
N
A
N
A
E.
M
A
38
.3
5
m
J
0.
15
m
J
27
.5
0
m
J
1.
29
m
J
38
.2
3
m
J
To
ta
le
ne
rg
y
co
ns
um
pt
io
n
T.
E.
C
41
.1
0
m
J
46
.1
7
+
2t
2
m
J
32
3.
28
m
J
15
1.
65
m
J
42
.3
9
m
J
1
Th
ek
ey
po
ol
siz
eP
is
eq
ua
lt
o
th
en
um
be
ro
fs
en
so
rn
od
es
m
ul
tip
lie
d
by
10
,a
nd
P
c
is
eq
ua
lt
o
0.
99
%
2
H
er
e,
t
de
no
te
sa
nu
nk
no
w
nt
im
e;
th
et
im
ec
an
no
tb
ed
et
er
m
in
ed
be
ca
us
et
he
sc
he
m
ei
nv
ol
ve
se
nc
ry
pt
io
na
nd
de
cr
yp
tio
nd
ur
in
g
th
e
ke
y
di
str
ib
ut
io
n
pr
oc
es
s,
an
d
th
e
so
ur
ce
di
d
no
ts
pe
ci
fy
th
e
ty
pe
of
en
cr
yp
tio
n
an
d
de
cr
yp
tio
n
al
go
rit
hm
us
ed
.
31
As shown in Table 5.1, the nodes’ transceivers consume the lowest amount of
energy in the proposed protocol, followed by scheme[55], at 2.75 mJ and 4.15 mJ ,
respectively; whereas, the nodes’ transceivers consume the largest amount of energy in
scheme[44], followed by scheme[45] and scheme[35], at 295.77 mJ , 150.37 mJ , and
46.02mJ , respectively.
In contrast, the nodes’ microcontrollers consume the lowest amount of energy
in scheme[35], followed by scheme[45] and scheme[44], at 0.15 mJ , 1.29 mJ , and
27.50 mJ , respectively, and the largest amount of energy consumed is in the proposed
protocol, followed by scheme[55], at 38.35mJ and 38.23mJ , respectively.
However, the total energy consumption in the proposed protocol is 41.10 mJ ,
which is the lowest relative to the total energy consumed by each of the corresponding
schemes. This result is intuitive because the proposed protocol is designed to perform
key distribution based on efficient data computation rather than data communication.
5.1.2 Key Storage Overhead
Table 5.2: Key Storage overhead for each scheme.
Scheme Key Storage Overhead
The proposed protocol 3
Scheme[35] 2 ·√n− 1
Scheme[44] 6
Scheme[45]
√−P · log(1− Pc)1
Scheme[55] n
n represents the number of nodes.
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1 The key pool size p is equal to the number of sensor nodes
multiplied by 10, and Pc is equal to 0.99 %.
Table 5.2 illustrates the key storage overhead of the proposed protocol and the
corresponding schemes. In the pre-deployment phase of the proposed protocol, each
sensor node stores two keys, AKnodes and Klocal. Then, in the key distribution phase,
each sensor node prepares its unique key,Kunique. Therefore, the proposed protocol has
the lowest key storage overhead for each sensor node compared to the corresponding
schemes. The logarithmic graph presented in Figure 5.1 shows the magnitude of the key
storage overhead as the number of sensor nodes increases. The graph clearly shows that
the proposed protocol is advantageous because it requires the fewest keys compared to
other schemes.
Figure 5.1: The magnitude of key storage overhead
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5.1.3 Key Connectivity
To evaluate the key connectivity in each scheme, we model the entire WSN with
a graph in which the vertices represent wireless sensor nodes and the edges represent
links. Therefore, Figure (5.2-a) shows a random deployment of 200 nodes over an area
of 1000 ft · 1000 ft. In Figure (5.2-b), the black links indicate the wireless signal range
of the nodes’ transceivers without applying either the proposed protocol or the corre-
sponding schemes. The wireless signal range is based on the nodes’ transceiver modules
(described in Chapter 4, Secion 4.1).
Figure 5.3 shows the implementation of the proposed protocol and the corre-
sponding schemes on the WSN shown in Figure (5.2-b). However, when two sensor
nodes share a common key or key material within the same wireless range, the black
links are converted to green links. In contrast, the red links indicate nodes that do not
share a common key or any key materials. This modeling shows the key connectivity
of each scheme, which can be defined as follows:
Secured links
Total number of links
· 100, (5.1)
where the term ”Secured links” includes any link between two nodes that share a
common key or key materials, and “Total number of links” counts all links in the
WSN. Figure (5.3-a), (5.3-c) and (5.3-e) show that the key connectivity is certain
because nodes in these schemes are designed to have either a shared common key or
key materials that lead to 100 % key connectivity. In contrast, the key connectivities in
(5.3-b) and (5.3-d) reach only 87 % and 99 %, respectively.
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Figure 5.2: Modeling aWSN: (a) random deployment of sensor nodes; (b) wireless signal range of nodes’
transceivers.
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Figure 5.3: Key connectivity after implementing key distribution/establishment process for each scheme.
(a) the proposed protocol; (b) scheme[35]; (c) scheme[44]; (d) scheme[45] ; (e) scheme[55]
5.2 Security Analysis
5.2.1 Replay Attack
In a replay attack, an adversary captures a copy of exchanged frames to resend
them later to the receiver for a deceptive purpose. The goal is for the receiver to
believe that the resent messages are new messages; however, the receiver receives old
information. This type of attack cannot be performed against the proposed protocol
because a timestamp T is employed as a countermeasure in all three on-line phases:
key distribution, post-key distribution and key refreshment. In the key distribution and
key refreshment phases, the timestamp T is appended to each complementary key sent
to the sensor nodes:
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send
==⇒
[
C ←− EAKsink
(
Kcompl || Tag ←− H(Kcompl) || T
)]
send
==⇒
[
C ←− EAKsink
(
Kcomplnew || Tag ←− H(Kcomplnew) || T
)]
.
In the post-key-distribution phase , each sensor node appends a timestamp T to
each frame sent to the sink node.
send
==⇒
[
Id′i || C ←− E⊥Kuniquei (D || Idi || T )
]
.
This timestamp allows the sink node to validate whether the received data are replayed
data. However, none of the corresponding schemes implement a countermeasure
against replay attacks.
5.2.2 Man-In-The-Middle Attack
During a man-in-the-middle attack, an adversary secretly intercepts frames
from the sender and likely modifies them. Then, the adversary resends the frames to
the receiver. This process occurs without the knowledge of the sender and receiver;
therefore, both parties assume that they are communicating directly with one another.
However, the proposed protocol is secure against man-in-the-middle attacks because in
the pre-deployment phase, an asymmetric key pair is generated, renamed AKsink and
AKnodes, and loaded into the sink node, and the sensor nodes, respectively.
39
{KP , KR}←− RSAgen
KP
def
= AKsink and KR
def
= AKnodes.
Thus, during the key distribution and key refreshment phases, when the sink node
encrypts the complementary key with AKsink:
C ←− EAKsink
(
Kcompl || Tag ←− H(Kcompl) || T
)
.
Only the sensor nodes are able to decrypt the cipher because they already possess one
key of the asymmetric key pair.
Additionally, in the post-key distribution phase, each sensor node encrypts data
with its unique key that is only in the possession of the sensor node and the sink node.
C ←− E⊥Kuniquei (D || Idi || T ) .
Therefore, an adversary cannot impersonate either the sink node or any sensor
node in the proposed protocol. Scheme [55] is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks;
however, the other compared schemes are not subjected to this type of attack.
5.2.3 Node Capture Attack
To investigate the resilience of the proposed protocol and the corresponding
schemes against node capture attacks, node capture attacks must be launched on the
key connectivity of each scheme. Therefore, as shown in Figure 5.4, we mount node
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capture attacks on the key connectivity of each scheme presented in Figure 5.3. Thus,
Figure 5.4 shows each scheme’s resilience against node capture attacks. The impact of
a node capture attack can be defined as follows:
Compromised links
Total number of secured links
· 100, (5.2)
where “Compromised links” indicates the number of links that are com-
promised after a random number of sensor nodes have been captured, and
“Total number of secured links” counts any link between two nodes that share a
common key or key materials. However, each scheme has a different design; thus, for
fairness, we assume the following:
• An adversary is able to physically capture 5 % of the sensor nodes randomly
(i.e.,10 sensor nodes in the example network).
• Because capturing the sink node will compromise any givenWSN, in Assumption
1, node capture does not include the sink node.
• Capturing a sensor node reveals all the data that node contains. For example, if
the captured sensor node contains data that reveal information about other nodes’
common keys or keys materials, those keys are also compromised.
In Figure (5.4-a), the key connectivity of the proposed protocol does not change
after 10 sensor nodes are captured, which indicates that the proposed protocol is secure
against node capture attacks. However, the key connectivities of the networks in (5.4-b)
and (5.4-c) are decreased by 51 % and 75 %, respectively (assuming the network in
(5.4-c) has 4 clusters and that some of the compromised nodes are located in 3 different
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clusters). The key connectivity in (5.4-d) is only slightly affected, decreasing by only
6 %. In contrast, the network in (5.4-e) is heavily impacted, and the key connectivity is
decreased by 100 %.
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Figure 5.4: Schemes’ resilience against node capture attacks. (a) The proposed protocol; (b) Scheme[35];
(c) Scheme[44]; (d) Scheme[45] ; (e) Scheme[55]
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CHAPTER 6: FORMAL VERIFICATION
To formally prove the security and soundness of the proposed protocol, we utilize
ProVerif, an automatic cryptographic protocol verifier. ProVerif is a powerful tool for
automatically analyzing the security of cryptographic protocols and verifying them in a
formal model.
In this section, we present the verification results pertaining to reachability and
secrecy, correspondence assertions (authentication), and observational equivalences.
6.1 Reachability And Secrecy
ProVerif provides proof of reachability and secrecy properties by investigating
the reachability of a term x by an adversary A. Based on the results, the secrecy of x
can be assessed with respect to the modeled protocol. In the proposed protocol, we test
whether sensor data “sensorData” are available to A. Figure 6.1 shows the complete
verification result. The result concludes, “RESULT not attacker(sensorData[ ]) is true”,
meaning that “sensorData” is unreachable, and an attack cannot be conducted against
the protocol successfully.
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Reachability and Secrecy
Process:
{1}new senkey: prkey;
{2}let sinkey: pukey = pk(senkey) in
{3}new sensor1LocKey: localK;
{4}new sensor2LocKey: localK;
{5}new uK: uniquKey;
{6}insert sinkt(sensorA,sensor1LocKey);
{7}insert sinkt(sensorB,sensor2LocKey);
(
{8}!
{9}new k_118: compKey;
{10}let tag: compKey = h(k_118) in
{11}new t: time;
{12}new r_119: Padding;
{13}let c: bitstring = internal_aenc((k_118,tag,t),sinkey,r_119) in
{14}out(ch, c);
{15}in(ch, (senIdX: sensors,y_120: bitstring));
{23}get sinkt(=senIdX,slocl: localK) in
{16}let SenUniqueKey’: uniquKey = xor(slocl,k_118) in
{17}let (AuthIden: sensors,tz: time,s2: bitstring) =
sdecrypt(y_120,SenUniqueKey’) in
{18}if (senIdX = AuthIden) then
46
{19}event acceptsSink(tz);
{20}new sit: time;
{21}if (tz = sit) then
{22}event termSink(AuthIden)
) | (
{24}!
{25}in(ch, x_121: bitstring);
{26}let (cK: compKey,tagX: compKey,tx: time) = decrypt(x_121,senkey) in
{27}new snt: time;
{28}if (tx = snt) then
{29}let tag2: compKey = h(cK) in
{30}if (tagX = tag2) then
{31}event acceptsSensor(cK,tx);
{32}let SenUniqueKey: uniquKey = xor(sensor1LocKey,cK) in
{33}new ty: time;
{34}new r_122: Randomness;
{35}let c’: bitstring =
internal_senc((sensorA,ty,sensorData),SenUniqueKey,r_122) in
{36}out(ch, (sensorA,c’));
{37}event termSensor(sensorA)
)
– Query not attacker(sensorData[ ])
Completing...
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Starting query not attacker(sensorData[ ])
RESULT not attacker(sensorData[ ]) is true.
Figure 6.1: Verification result of reachability and secrecy.
6.2 Correspondence Assertions
In ProVerif, authentication can be modeled using a sequence of events defined as
correspondence assertions. We apply a sequence of events to verify the authentication
of the sink node and the complementary key to the sensor nodes and the authentication
of the sensor nodes and encrypted data to the sink node. Figure 6.2 shows the complete
verification result. The verification confirmes that the proposed protocol achieves
successful authentication.
Correspondence Assertions
Process:
{1}new senkey: prkey;
{2}let sinkey: pukey = pk(senkey) in
{3}new sensor1LocKey: localK;
{4}new sensor2LocKey: localK;
{5}new uK: uniquKey;
{6}insert sinkt(sensorA,sensor1LocKey);
{7}insert sinkt(sensorB,sensor2LocKey);
(
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{8}!
{9}new k_124: compKey;
{10}let tag: compKey = h(k_124) in
{11}new t: time;
{12}new r_125: Padding;
{13}let c: bitstring = internal_aenc((k_124,tag,t),sinkey,r_125) in
{14}out(ch, c);
{15}in(ch, (senIdX: sensors,y_126: bitstring));
{23}get sinkt(=senIdX,slocl: localK) in
{16}let SenUniqueKey’: uniquKey = xor(slocl,k_124) in
{17}let (AuthIden: sensors,tz: time,s2: bitstring) =
sdecrypt(y_126,SenUniqueKey’) in
{18}if (senIdX = AuthIden) then
{19}event acceptsSink(tz);
{20}new sit: time;
{21}if (tz = sit) then
{22}event termSink(AuthIden)
) | (
{24}!
{25}in(ch, x_127: bitstring);
{26}let (cK: compKey,tagX: compKey,tx: time) = decrypt(x_127,senkey) in
{27}new snt: time;
{28}if (tx = snt) then
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{29}let tag2: compKey = h(cK) in
{30}if (tagX = tag2) then
{31}event acceptsSensor(cK,tx);
{32}let SenUniqueKey: uniquKey = xor(sensor1LocKey,cK) in
{33}new ty: time;
{34}new r_128: Randomness;
{35}let c’: bitstring =
internal_senc((sensorA,ty,sensorData),SenUniqueKey,r_128) in
{36}out(ch, (sensorA,c’));
{37}event termSensor(sensorA)
)
– Query inj-event(termSink(y_130)) ==> inj-event(acceptsSink(x_129))
Completing...
Starting query inj-event(termSink(y_130)) ==> inj-event(acceptsSink(x_129))
RESULT inj-event(termSink(y_130)) ==> inj-event(acceptsSink(x_129)) is true.
– Query inj-event(termSensor(z)) ==> inj-event(acceptsSensor(x_696,y_697))
Completing...
Starting query inj-event(termSensor(z)) ==>
inj-event(acceptsSensor(x_696,y_697))
RESULT inj-event(termSensor(z)) ==> inj-event(acceptsSensor(x_696,y_697))
is true.
Figure 6.2: Verification result of authentication.
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6.3 Observational Equivalence
In applied π-calculus terminology, two processes p1 and p2 have observational
equivalence (p1 ≈ p2) when they are indistinguishable through observation. ProVerif
can prove observational equivalence such as strong secrecy, in which an adversary A
cannot distinguish when a cipher changes. We leverage this feature to prove that the
proposed protocol is semantically secure and that the A cannot learn anything from the
cipher. Figure 6.3 shows the complete verification result. The analysis showes that the
sensor data “sensorData” in the proposed protocol are observationally equivalent and
that the A cannot distinguish when they change because the data are encrypted by a
probabilistic algorithm, as described in the post-key distribution phase.
Observational Equivalence
Process:
{1}new senkey: prkey;
{2}let sinkey: pukey = pk(senkey) in
{3}new sensor1LocKey: localK;
{4}new sensor2LocKey: localK;
{5}new uK: uniquKey;
{6}insert sinkt(sensorA,sensor1LocKey);
{7}insert sinkt(sensorB,sensor2LocKey);
(
{8}!
{9}new k_124: compKey;
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{10}let tag: compKey = h(k_124) in
{11}new t: time;
{12}new r_125: Padding;
{13}let c: bitstring = internal_aenc((k_124,tag,t),sinkey,r_125) in
{14}out(ch, c);
{15}in(ch, (senIdX: sensors,y_126: bitstring));
{23}get sinkt(=senIdX,slocl: localK) in
{16}let SenUniqueKey’: uniquKey = xor(slocl,k_124) in
{17}let (AuthIden: sensors,tz: time,s2: bitstring) =
sdecrypt(y_126,SenUniqueKey’) in
{18}if (senIdX = AuthIden) then
{19}event acceptsSink(tz);
{20}new sit: time;
{21}if (tz = sit) then
{22}event termSink(AuthIden)
) | (
{24}!
{25}in(ch, x_127: bitstring);
{26}let (cK: compKey,tagX: compKey,tx: time) = decrypt(x_127,senkey) in
{27}new snt: time;
{28}if (tx = snt) then
{29}let tag2: compKey = h(cK) in
{30}if (tagX = tag2) then
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{31}event acceptsSensor(cK,tx);
{32}let SenUniqueKey: uniquKey = xor(sensor1LocKey,cK) in
{33}new ty: time;
{34}new r_128: Randomness;
{35}let c’: bitstring =
internal_senc((sensorA,ty,sensorData),SenUniqueKey,r_128) in
{36}out(ch, (sensorA,c’));
{37}event termSensor(sensorA)
)
– Non-interference sensorData
Completing...
RESULT Non-interference sensorData is true (bad not derivable).
Figure 6.3: Verification result of observational equivalence.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION
In this work, we propose a practical key distribution protocol that can be im-
plemented above the IEEE 802.15.4 standard to secure the wireless communication of
resource-constrained sensor nodes. We utilized existing cryptographic primitives to de-
sign a protocol that maintains a tradeoff between efficiency and security. We conducted
simulation, hardware implementations, and modeling to compare the proposed proto-
col to the existing solutions. Moreover, we conducted formal verifications to prove the
soundness and the security of our proposed protocol. The proposed protocol provides
low energy and memory consumption, certain key connectivity, and security against:
replay attack, man-in-the-middle attack, and node capture attack. The overall results
show that the proposed protocol is more efficient and secure than the corresponding
schemes.
Future work includes examining more advanced methods to enhance the energy
consumption of the proposed protocol. For example, using more efficient algorithms
to perform data computation. Furthermore, investigating additional types of attacks
against the proposed protocol to increase its security.
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